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RULES AND OUTCOMES:
Brazil in Transition during the 1990s
J. Peter Ferderer
I. Introduction
Brazil, like many other countries in Latin America, has radically
altered the “rules of the game” that govern its economic and
political systems in recent years. After two decades of military
rule, democracy was restored in 1985 and a new constitution
established in 1988. Then, starting in the early 1990s, Brazil
began to restructure its economic system. It began in 1991 with
the Mercosul Agreement — the establishment of a free trade
zone between Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay. This
was followed by the Real Plan in 1994, which sought to end
years of high inflation by introducing a new currency (the real)
pegged to the U.S. dollar. At the same time, the relationship
between the private and public sectors has undergone a funda-
mental change, complete with privatization of state-owned
firms and fiscal reform.
This paper examines these developments and explores the
various economic and political forces behind the recent attempts
at liberalization. I do so by drawing on two different perspec-
tives. The first is that of a macroeconomist and economic histo-
rian; the second, as a participant in the Macalester College
Faculty Development International Seminar.1 The essay looks at
the recent policy changes in Brazil by viewing them through the
lens of two disparate economic literatures: the “new” institu-
tional economics and modern growth theory. The argument that
emerges is straightforward. The institutional structures and
rules of the game in society determine the pace of technological
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and human capital development and, ultimately, the well-being
of its members. When particular rules produce bad outcomes,
political pressure is created to change the rules. The objective of
this paper is to examine how this process has worked in Brazil.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses,
on a general level, the interplay between the rules of the game
and economic outcomes. Particular emphasis is given to the role
that technological and human capital development play in the
process of economic growth and how the rules influence the
pace of this development. Section III contrasts the two compet-
ing ideological perspectives that shaped policy formation in
Brazil in recent decades. Section IV examines two of the most
important economic outcomes produced by the “old” rules —
namely, high inflation and increasing economic isolation — and
explores the role that each played in constraining technological
and human capital development. Section V provides an
overview of the new rules, and Section VI examines why the
path of economic liberalization was chosen. The essay ends with
a few concluding remarks.
II. Knowledge, Demography, and Institutions
According to Nobel laureate Douglass North, a leading contrib-
utor to the new institutional economics, the interplay of three
forces determine how economic systems evolve over time.2 The
first is the stock of knowledge, which “determines the human com-
mand over nature” and the “potential upper bound of the well-
being of the society.” The second is demography, which includes
not only the “fertility, mortality, and migration characteristics
and labor-force composition, but also the stock of human capital
(derived from the stock of knowledge).” Finally, the institutional
framework and associated rules of the game shape the incentive
structure of society.
Modern growth theory focuses on one particular form of
knowledge: technology. Technology is important because it
determines the extent to which basic raw materials can be trans-
formed into final goods and services. Advances in technology
(or “ideas”) include the discovery of new goods (e.g., electricity,
plastics, microprocessors, etc.) and methods of production (e.g.,
the assembly line, just-in-time inventory management, etc.). It is
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now widely accepted by economists that advances in technol-
ogy are largely responsible for the tremendous growth in stan-
dard of living experienced by the industrialized world in the
twentieth century.3
Technology plays such an important role in the creation of
wealth because it is largely a nonrival good.4 That is, when one
person uses knowledge to produce a good or service, this action
does not preclude others from doing so as well. The nonrival-
rous feature of technology distinguishes it from other inputs
into production (e.g., a piece of capital equipment or labor),
which, by their very nature, can be used in only one place at a
time. To illustrate, consider the production of computers. The
“idea” or “recipe” for making a computer can be used by many
different economic units (i.e., IBM, Dell, Compaq, Gateway
2000, etc.) simultaneously, while the use of a particular factory
to produce computers by one firm precludes others from using
it. The essential implication is that the returns to society from
investment in technology, vis-à-vis other factors of production,
are enormous. As I argue below, it is the recognition of the cru-
cial role of technology that has driven much of the recent institu-
tional change in Brazil.
Modern growth theory also emphasizes the human capital
dimension of demography. Human capital is the set of special-
ized skills that people acquire from society’s stock of knowledge
by devoting time to “schooling.” Investment in human capital
takes place through formal education, such as learning calculus
in high school, or on-the-job learning. Unlike technology,
human capital is knowledge embedded in people. Thus it is
rival in nature. Moreover, society’s stock of human capital is
subject to entropy over time as people die. Nevertheless, human
capital determines the productivity of labor and its ability to cre-
ate wealth. Finally, economists generally believe that differences
in human capital are the main factor that explains wage and
unemployment differentials in society.
The institutional framework and associated rules of the game
are the final leg of the stool. Institutions and rules are man-
made. Examples of important rules that I discuss below in the
Brazilian context are (a) the property rights system (who owns
what), (b) “openness” of the foreign trade regime (who can
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trade with whom), and (c) rules governing money creation (who
controls it and what factors constrain them).
Understanding the interplay between knowledge, demogra-
phy, and institutions is key to understanding how economies
and societies evolve over time. For instance, consider the case of
technological development. While technology is a largely nonri-
val good, it is partially excludable in many societies in that the
creator of a new idea can, for a given amount of time and under
certain circumstances, prevent others from using it. This possi-
bility arises, not from the inherent nature of the idea, but from
patent and copyright laws that have been put in place by soci-
ety. These rules are vital because they create incentives for peo-
ple to produce new ideas (i.e., through research and
development) by insuring they receive monopoly rents for their
effort.
Rules certainly determine economic and social outcomes, but
the causality is not unidirectional. If the outcomes produced by
the existing rules are unsatisfactory, political pressure is created
to change the rules. Steady state equilibrium is reached only
when the outcomes produced by the existing set of rules no
longer create pressure for these rules to be changed. As I argue
in the remainder of the paper, Brazil is in transition toward a
new steady state equilibrium.
III. The Old Rules
The rules of the game in place during any particular period of
history reflect, in part, the victory of one ideological perspective
over another. In the case of Brazil, two radically different per-
spectives have competed to set the rules.
The orthodox perspective holds that certain fundamental
laws govern all economic systems (i.e., economic agents ratio-
nally maximize utility and profit subject to budget constraints,
inflation is primarily a monetary phenomenon, etc.) and that the
welfare of society is maximized when unfettered markets, rather
than governments, determine outcomes. This perspective has
emanated from sources largely outside of Brazil — such as the
University of Chicago and the International Monetary Fund —
but is also popular in certain domestic strongholds such as the
Vargas Foundation in Rio de Janerio. One controversial aspect
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of this perspective is the suggestion that a particular set of rules
are equally applicable to all nations. William Barber articulates
this point:
If one presupposes that the truths of economic science are univer-
sal and timeless, a “one size fits all” approach to economic policy
making readily follows. The particularities of diverse culture,
institutional, and historical environments are expunged from this
view of the world. It remains an open question whether optimal
economic policies can be formulated when these aspects of real-
ity are ignored.5
In strict opposition to this view, the heterodox perspective
argues that countries should:
reject “models” premised on the view that economic “laws” had
universal validity. They should instead build analytical struc-
tures of their own — ones which reflected the particularities of
their structural circumstances.6
For example, with regard to trade policy, the dependency theory
view of the world argues that there exists a “systematic bias in
the terms of trade in favor of the rich industrialized countries, at
the expense of the poor ones dependent on exporting primary
products.”7
The heterodox perspective dominated policy-making in
Brazil until the 1990s and, as a result, the rules of the game
reflected this view. In particular, the rules were set to support
domestic firms over their foreign competitors through policies
of import-substitution and protectionism. On the domestic
front, government intervention in the economy was pervasive,
with the state ownership of many manufacturing and banking
firms. Finally, there were few constraints placed on government
spending (e.g., central bank independence) and the monetiza-
tion of public debt.
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IV. Growing Pressure for Rule Changes
This section focuses on two features of the Brazilian economy
produced by the old set of rules, namely, high inflation and
increasing economic isolation. The objective is to examine how
these two outcomes influenced human capital and technological
development and, ultimately, set the stage for a change in the
rules.
A. Inflation
One of the dominant features of the Brazilian economic land-
scape over the past two decades has been high inflation. This
can be seen in figure 1. Prior to implementation of the Real Plan
in 1994, the inflation rate was rising, with each new peak in
inflation exceeding the previous one. In some years, inflation
rates in excess of 5,000 percent (on an annual basis) were com-
mon.
The two competing perspectives discussed above were clearly
visible in academic and policy circles during the 1980s, when the
causes of Brazilian inflation were debated and solutions pro-
posed.8 The orthodox (or monetarist) perspective saw inflation
as largely the result of excessive increases in money supply due,
in part, to lack of control over the government budget. In con-
trast, the heterodox (or Neo-Structuralist) school argued that
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Source: Boletim do Banco Central do Brasil, Volume 32, no. 7, Separata.
FIGURE 1
characteristics unique to the Brazilian economy led to rising
prices, which were then accommodated by monetary expansion.
In particular, the Brazilian economy was dominated by large oli-
gopolistic firms (private and state-owned) and strong labor
unions. Given this particular structure — a structure foreign to
the competitive models used by the orthodox school — inflation
was seen as the end product of a “fight-for-shares” struggle
between different sectors of the economy that had monopoly
power.9
During the 1980s, the heterodox view dominated policy-mak-
ing. Because inflation was thought to be the product of a “coor-
dination problem” and “inertial” in nature, the obvious solution
was for the government to impose price and wage controls.
Thus prices were frozen as part of the stabilization plans
(Cruzado, Bresser, Verao, Collor I and Collor II) undertaken
during the 1980s and early 1990s. Although these plans differed
in many respects, they shared two common elements. First, they
did not work. Second, each was motivated by the heterodox
view of inflation and did not seek to radically change the rules
of the game that would ultimately come to be seen as the funda-
mental source of inflation.10
What impact did this inflation have on Brazilian society? Did
it lead to a slower pace of human capital and technological
development? The answers are not as transparent as one might
first think. After all, why should people care if it costs 5,000 per-
cent more cruzados to buy goods this year than it did last year if,
at the same time, wages expressed in cruzados have risen by the
same percentage?
From a somewhat narrow perspective — one that does not
consider the issues raised in Section II — economists have
focused on two channels through which high inflation adversely
affects the economy. First, savers are less willing to hold long-
term assets whose real returns become more uncertain in the
face of greater inflation uncertainty. Consequently, the cost of
long-term borrowing rises and firms accumulate less capital.11
Judging by the share of GDP dedicated to investment spending
— which fell from around 20 percent in the 1970s to 14 – 16 per-
cent during the late 1980s — this seems to have been an impor-
tant channel.
J. Peter Ferderer
155
Second, inflation introduces noise into the price system and as
the information conveyed by relative prices falls, economic effi-
ciency and long-term growth of the system decrease. The effect
of relative price confusion on the economy is difficult to mea-
sure. Nevertheless, there is evidence that determination of rela-
tive prices was a major problem confronted by Brazilian
enterprises during the hyperinflation. For example, one of the
main activities of the Vargas Foundation during the hyperinfla-
tion was the construction of customized price indexes that firms
and agencies used to assess the “true” cost of their inputs. That
is, these groups needed to know that when they purchased
cement, for example, they were paying the fair market price. In a
world with stable prices, there is less need for such information.
From a broader perspective, it is possible that inflation alters
the demographic landscape of society by distorting the signals
that guide human capital investment. Axel Leijonhufvud
explains how this might occur:
[T]he ability to forecast inflation and to hedge against it when it
cannot be forecast with any accuracy becomes more important to
the success and survival of firms than efficiency and competitive-
ness in the production and distribution of goods and services.
The rules of the economy’s natural selection of individuals for
fame and fortune change: finance people are favored over mar-
keting people, lawyers over product designers, accountants over
production managers. People, especially ambitious people, will
allocate their efforts and ingenuity accordingly.12
Do we see these reactions in Brazil? During the inflationary
1980s and early 1990s, banks in Brazil generated a great deal of
profit by engaging in the “float”—i.e., issuing demand deposits
whose return was not indexed to inflation and using the pro-
ceeds to buy short-term indexed government bonds. They did
this rather than specialize in the activity that banks normally
specialize in: the collection and analysis of information about
potential borrowers. Did the development of human capital in
the area of credit analysis suffer as a result? This is difficult to
answer, but the recent wave of bank failures resulting from bad
loans suggests that it may have.
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The movement away from traditional activities was not
unique to the banking sector. Manufacturing firms spent consid-
erable time and resources engaging in “inventory speculation”
during the inflationary period. Thus human capital develop-
ment was directed toward learning when to buy and sell raw
materials rather than how to make and sell a better widget. In
addition, one comment you often hear from business people as
you travel in Brazil is that “budgets didn’t mean much during
the inflationary years.” This was due to the high level of price
and cost unpredictability. With the loss of budgeting as a man-
agement tool, managers had less ability to control the various
sectors of their organization. This loss of control can be viewed
as technological regression.
Leijonhufvud also argues that in addition to skewing incen-
tives for human capital and technological development within
the private sector, inflation can lead to the public sector taking
on activities that it is not well suited to perform:
When contracting increasingly fails, political lobbying becomes a
substitute strategy for many groups. . . . [M]onetary mismanage-
ment will bring in its wake efforts by all sorts of groups to obtain
by public compulsion what private cooperation failed to achieve.
Legislatures will be swamped by demands to control this price or
that rent, to regulate his or her way of doing business, to tax X
and subsidize Y.13
That is, there is increasing political pressure for governments to
intervene in markets when inflation is high and price increases
are not synchronized (e.g., interest payments rise faster than
output prices, or apartment rents rise faster than wages).
Do we see this effect in Brazil? Clearly, we do. Brazil has a
complex system of administered “minimum wages” that are set
to protect workers from market forces that are exacerbated
when all prices do not move together. Moreover, “indexation” is
imposed on markets to make up for the lack of synchronization
between price and wage movements. We also see this when the
government bails out firms and banks whose price rises do not
keep up with cost increases.
Finally, one cannot travel through Brazil without being struck
by the income inequality. The contrast between the rich and the
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poor has led some observers to describe Brazil as “Belgium in
India.” It can be argued that this disparity contributes to the
social tension one observes in Brazil (e.g., pervasive pickpocket-
ing, high murder rates, and repressive police forces). Moreover,
the inequality retards human capital development (e.g., what
skills are being developed by the hoards of gatekeepers that
populate the wealthier sections of Brazilian cities?).
Did the high inflation of the 1980s contribute to income
inequality in Brazil? According to the Central Bank of Brazil it
did. The reason is that the poor segments of society did not have
access to the mechanisms to protect the purchasing power of
their income that the wealthier segments had. These mecha-
nisms include the holding of dollars rather than cruzados (or
holding indexed cruzado deposits) during the period between
receipt of income and payment of expenses. Instead, the poor
were forced to hold cruzado currency, which could lose 80 per-
cent of its value over the course of a month.
According to Leijonhufvud, high inflation and its effects
cause governments to become less efficient in “carrying out their
proper business.” In the end,
The political system thus loses legitimacy, and a generation of
politicians will come to face the public demand for new constitu-
tional constraints on government—constraints not imposed on a
previous generation of legislators.14
Clearly, we see evidence of this dynamic process between
inflation and political implosion in Brazil. It cannot simply be a
coincidence that major constitutional changes began to take
place in Brazil beginning in 1988 after several years of sustained
inflation.
B. Economic Isolation
Brazil has pursued the inward-directed policies of import-sub-
stitution and protectionism for decades. As discussed in section
III, these policies were, in part, a response to the dependency
theory view that Brazilian firms were at a competitive disadvan-
tage vis-à-vis their foreign counterparts and thus needed tariff
and quota protection.
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At the same time that the Brazilian government was protect-
ing domestic firms from foreign competition, government-
imposed trade barriers in other countries fell dramatically as a
result of major changes in the rules of the game that govern
world trade. These include the creation of regional trading blocs
—i.e., the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and
the European Union (EU)—and an increase in the liberalization
of global trade as a result of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT). These changes in world trading rules have
occurred largely outside the control of the Brazilian people.
Nevertheless, they have had a profound impact on Brazil.
One impact was that the Brazilian economy actually became
less “open” to trade with the rest of the world by the early 1990s.
This is seen by looking at the ratio of imports plus exports to
GDP for Brazil. A five-year moving-average of this ratio is illus-
trated in figure 2.15 It clearly shows that the Brazilian economy
has become less open in recent years. Moreover, during the
same time period many other countries have become dramati-
cally more open. For example, the openness ratio for the United
States has more than doubled since the early 1970s. Thus the iso-
lation of the Brazilian economy is even more apparent when
examined in relative terms. One implication of this increasing
J. Peter Ferderer
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Source: The Penn World Tables
FIGURE 2
relative closeness is that Brazil’s share of world exports fell from
1.9 percent in 1984 to 0.9 percent in 1994.16
What impact has reduced trade had on Brazil? Has it affected
technological and human capital development? Consider the
case of TV programming, which has been a common target of
trade barriers. Dependency theory views quotas on the importa-
tion of TV programs as a positive development; imported pro-
grams displace Brazilian-produced shows and Brazilian
workers. If the imported program in question is MTV, then pro-
tectionism has even more value because it allows Brazil to avoid
“cultural colonization.”
In contrast, modern growth theory sees these barriers as being
adverse to the long-run health of Brazil. It is true that these
imports displace Brazilian-produced shows and Brazilians
working in this sector. On the other hand, Brazilian currency
earned by Americans in this transaction must ultimately be
spent in Brazil. Thus unemployed Brazilian TV workers will
experience a rise in the demand for their labor in other sectors of
the economy. But this point — which is the standard one made
about the gains from trade associated with comparative advan-
tage — is not the key issue here. If one believes that ideas and
knowledge are the principal sources of economic and social
progress, then the importation of TV programs provides addi-
tional benefits beyond those associated with comparative
advantage. These benefits may not be clear if the program in
question is MTV. However, Brazil’s access to the world’s stock
of knowledge is certainly enhanced by the importation of C-
Span, CNN, or TLC (The Learning Channel).17
V. The New Rules
As Leijonhufvud’s analysis suggests, adverse economic out-
comes such as hyperinflation and increasing economic isolation
create social chaos and cause the political system to lose legiti-
macy. The loss of legitimacy, in turn, generates popular support
for new constitutional constraints on governments. This
dynamic is evident in Brazil and is responsible for many of its
recent policy changes.
In the economic realm, three major thrusts of reform have
been initiated. First, Brazil has begun to change the rules of the
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game that govern international trade. In 1991, Brazil formed a
common market with three of its neighbors: Argentina,
Paraguay, and Uruguay. During the first phase of the Mercosul
agreement, tariffs were cut dramatically among its members.
Currently, most trade inside Mercosul is tariff-free, and by the
year 2000, all internal tariffs will be cut to zero. The agreement
also calls for the formation of a “customs union,” whereby mem-
bers of the group apply a common external tariff to imports of
nonmember countries. Finally, the member countries agreed in
1995 to a five-year plan to establish a “free trade” area. Such a
plan will standardize trade-related rules and harmonize broader
economic policies across the member nations.
The second thrust of reform has been on the monetary front.
In July of 1994, Brazil initiated the “Real Plan.” The mastermind
of the plan was President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who
was minister of finance when the plan was conceived. The plan
consists of several purely monetary measures intended to end
high inflation. First, the battered cruzado, which had lost much
of its value during the recent inflationary years, was replaced by
a new currency, the real. More important, the new currency was
pegged to the U.S. dollar. This rule change has provided a
“nominal anchor” on monetary policy in Brazil. In essence, it
ties the hands of the Central Bank and forces it to expand the
money supply at a rate similar to that of the United States.
In contrast to its predecessors, the Real Plan explicitly recog-
nized that the primary source of inflation was the political struc-
ture, which permitted and promoted excessive money creation.
This point is emphasized by the Central Bank of Brazil:
The worsening of Brazilian inflation in the early 1980s generated
a series of economic stabilization plans. The programs intro-
duced prior to the Real Plan were generally based on high levels
of intervention in the economy, in the form of price freezes or
cutbacks in liquidity levels, while the fundamental question of
structural reform was relegated to a position of lesser impor-
tance. . . . The Real Plan was targeted at the fundamental causes of
inflation, particularly public sector financial equilibrium.18
The recent experience of Banespa, the São Paulo state devel-
opment bank, helps to illustrate the nature of the problem.19 In
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the election year of 1990, the governor of the state of São Paulo,
Mario Covas, borrowed $600 million from Banespa to finance
“development projects” in the state. Four years earlier, Covas’s
predecessor had taken out a $350 million loan for similar pur-
poses. Both loans were guaranteed by future São Paulo state tax
revenues. However, neither loan was repaid or serviced and, as
of late 1996, the state of São Paulo was in arrears to the tune of
$19 billion to Banespa.20 In the past, such debts would be
absorbed or “socialized” by the federal government and ulti-
mately paid for by printing new money. It is this “monetization”
of government deficits that, according to the orthodox view,
caused the high inflation of the late 1980s and early 1990s.21 In
effect, the inflation problem was largely a political problem in
that incumbent politicians used the money supply to further
their narrow political ends.
Another source of the inflation problem has been the public-
sector pension system. According to The Economist, it “repre-
sents the largest single threat to Brazil’s fiscal health, and thus to
the sustainability of Mr. Cardoso’s hitherto successful efforts to
kill chronic inflation.”22 The system breaks almost every known
rule of financial prudence. There is no minimum age require-
ment (e.g., 80 percent of state government workers in the state of
Paraná retire before the age of 56, 44 percent before 46). It allows
retired people to draw more than one pension and, in some
cases, retire with higher incomes than when they were working.
People can continue to work full time while receiving a full pen-
sion.
In contrast to previous reform efforts, the current one recog-
nizes the crucial role that these features of the system have
played in the production of inflation. As a result, the Real Plan
has been accompanied by a third thrust of reform, one aimed at
changing the rules of the game that promote excessive money
creation. In many ways, this change reflects a victory of the
orthodox perspective over that of the heterodox and has pro-
duced pressure for change on several fronts.
First, efforts have been made to reduce government deficits
and to sever the link between politics and money creation. For
example, the Immediate Action Program (PAI), announced in
June 1993, sought to reduce the size of the federal budget,
reduce tax evasion, and encourage repayment of state and
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municipal debt to federal banks. Second, efforts have been made
at reform of the pension system. Recent proposals would set a
minimum age requirement, require minimum contributions,
limit pension incomes to the average of the past five years’
salary, and restrict retirees to one public-sector pension. Finally,
the National Privatization Program (PND) has begun to scale
back state participation in the productive sector of the economy
by the sale of state enterprises.23 In addition to reducing the gov-
ernment’s deficit by providing a one-time source of revenue, the
privatization program was intended to raise efficiency by
increasing competitiveness. Moreover, by alleviating the gov-
ernment of duties better carried out by the private sector, it is
hoped that the government will be in a better position to under-
take “traditional socially-oriented functions” and “other tasks
typical of government.”24
VI. Why Liberalize?
Why has Brazil decided to go down this path? Why has Brazil
chosen to liberalize after decades of the inward-directed policies
of import-substitution and protectionism, state ownership of
firms, and inflationary monetary policy?
Part of the answer to this question is obvious. A consensus
has emerged that the old rules were not producing rising living
standards for a majority of Brazilians and the recent push for
reform simply reflects the feedback loop running from outcomes
to rules. This is the type of response one would expect in a
democracy.
Moreover, the three different thrusts of reform discussed
above are not mutually exclusive attempts to improve the lot of
the average Brazilian. Rather, they reinforce one another with
each being fundamentally necessary for the success of the other.
That is, an environment of low inflation is necessary for the pro-
motion of trade because high inflation imposes risk on foreign
investors and creates balance-of-payments problems. On the
other hand, trade liberalization helps to keep a lid on inflation
by exposing domestic firms to greater competition.25 Also, as
stressed above, the fiscal and political reforms are necessary for
creating an environment of low inflation that is conducive to
international trade.
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Yet this analysis still does not address the fundamental ques-
tion: Why has Brazil chosen to adopt the liberal economic order?
For The Economist, a decidedly free-market British weekly, the
answer is clear.26 There has been growing recognition that
decades of import-substitution policies have left Brazilian firms
ill-equipped to compete with foreign firms. Greater exposure to
competition within Mercosul will thus prepare Brazil’s ineffi-
cient oligopolistic firms for worldwide competition in the com-
ing years. Moreover, Mercosul acts like a magnet attracting
foreign direct investment to Brazil. Thus the primary virtue of
liberalization is that it stimulates technological and human capi-
tal development. It does this by exposing domestic firms and
workers to foreign competition: they either improve or suffer
the consequences. However, while greater openness threatens
survival by raising competition, it also facilitates survival and
growth by enabling domestic firms to better access the world’s
growing stock of knowledge.
To illustrate this point, consider what has happened to the
Brazilian automobile industry. Over the past several years, U.S.
and European auto producers have been rushing into Brazil to
take advantage of the rising demand for consumer durables pro-
duced by Mercosul-induced economic growth. One outcome of
this process is that many Brazilian auto factories, loaded with
new technology, are equal or superior to those in the United
States in terms of productivity.27 Clearly, GM, Ford, Fiat, Volks-
wagen, and other foreign firms benefit from these investments,
but it is not a zero-sum game. Brazilians also benefit by learning
innovative technologies and management techniques (“learning
by doing”) practiced around the world, not to mention the
income that is earned by Brazilian firms that engage in joint ven-
tures with foreign firms.
For those who wish to dismiss this explanation on the basis of
its sources, consider the comments of Fernando Henrique Car-
doso—ex-Marxist academic and one of the early contributors to
the dependency theory literature. Cardoso argues that one of the
two great trends of the modern world is the globalization of the
world economy. The second is the “marriage of science, technol-
ogy, and freedom.” For Cardoso, freedom promotes technologi-
cal development, and technological development promotes
freedom:
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This “marriage” made it possible for the great technological revo-
lutions (from nuclear energy and the laser beam, to biotechnol-
ogy, to computers, microelectronics, and robotics) to go beyond
the factory walls and affect the organization of society[;] . . . it rev-
olutionizes the organization of the factory and of management; it
reaches the public sector, the schools, the churches, the unions,
and eventually, everything — not only through the new methods
of management it permits, but also through the establishment of
great mass-communication networks.28
Cardoso continues:
[T]he other pillar of socialism — the theory of exploitation (of
classes and of nations) — has been shaken by an earthquake of
magnitude 8 on the Richter scale: the technological-scientific rev-
olution has greatly reduced the mass of the exploited who are
necessary for the health of the capitalist system both at home and
among nations.29
According to Cardoso, nations like Brazil must thus make a
choice:
[E]ither the South (or a portion of it) enters the democratic-tech-
nological-scientific race, invests heavily in R&D [research and
development], and endures the “information economy” meta-
morphosis, or it becomes unimportant, unexploited, and unex-
ploitable. . . . A future with dignity for the countries of the South
will be achieved only with more education, a better state,
enhanced productivity from its “human capital,” and a great
technological leap forward (information technology, new materi-
als, environmental sense, and new modes of organization). Also
required are a democratized society and state.30
Cardoso, a powerful force in the recent institutional change in
Brazil, recognizes that technological and human capital devel-
opment are key to economic and social progress. Certainly, he is
no great admirer of laissez-faire economics.31 Yet he appreciates
the fact that certain liberal economic rules — free trade in the
global sphere and private enterprise and macroeconomic stabil-
ity in the domestic realm — are the best mechanisms for achiev-
ing these ends.
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VII. Conclusion
This paper is an expression of my attempt to make sense of the
monumental policy changes that have recently taken place in
Brazil. At one level, this is a very presumptuous endeavor,
doomed to failure by omission. After all, I have spent relatively
little time in Brazil and am by no means an expert on sociologi-
cal and political theory. At another level, however, there cer-
tainly is value in approaching a subject of study without strong
prior beliefs and a vested interest in the outcome. Moreover, I
believe that viewing Brazil through the lens of modern growth
theory and the new institutional economics helps us to better
understand the forces behind the recent changes.
I conclude the paper by considering one final idea. The radi-
cal Brazilian educator Paulo Freire, who died a few weeks prior
to our arrival in Brazil, stressed the importance of human capital
in improving the plight of the poor. In teaching literacy, he
wanted to instill in his students not just the ability to read, but
what he referred to as “a critical comprehension of reality.” For
example, he argued that32
We want to create schools where questioning is not a sin. It’s not
sin to make a critical study of Brazil’s reality. A small percentage
own land. Most people don’t.
Freire’s words are important because they remind us that rules
of the game, such as property rights for land, are not set in stone
and immutable through time. Rather, rules can be changed by
those who are affected by them. Moreover, a precondition for
the establishment of a fair and just set of rules is that all mem-
bers of society are able to participate in their construction and
have access to the human capital necessary to make this partici-
pation a fruitful one.
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BRAZIL BETWEEN MIRRORS
Galo F. González
I. Traveler Poet
It is not in vain that Roger Bastide, a French sociologist quoted
by Brazilian scholars Maria Lucia Caira Gitahy and Francisco
Foot Hardman, utilizes the concept of a “traveler poet” when
encountered with that extraordinarily vast and hybrid nation
named Brazil. Although Bastide directed his remarks mainly to
sociologists, his concept could also be applied to any field and
anyone who encounters Brazil for the first time. Bastide stated:
“The sociologist who wants to understand Brazil not rarely
needs to become a poet.”1 Along these lines, Professors Gitahy
and Hardman suggest that becoming a “traveler poet” may be a
requirement to better comprehend Brazil today.
In order to gain a comprehensive, accurate, and up-to-date
understanding of Brazil today, the travelers need to become
poets. For it is only with a poet’s eyes that we are able to reconcile
such drastically different situations and experiences, from the
lyric to the epic, from the tragicomic to the dramatic.2
In reflecting upon my encounter with Brazil, I find myself agree-
ing with these scholars’ opinions and perceptions. In fact, I even
wrote a poem in which I expressed what my eyes have seen and
my senses have felt.
Inspired by the enchanting Brazilian landscape and its peo-
ple, the poem, reproduced below, was written during a bus trip
between São Paolo and Rio de Janeiro. I must emphasize that
this is a very personal reflection and encounter with Brazil. Be
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